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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court issued on 17 April 2013 an important 
precedent that served as a culmination to the well-known case brought by 
Esther Kiobel and other Nigerian plaintiffs against the oil giant Shell, Kio-
bel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al.1 This case, on which large hopes 
were deposited by human rights activists worldwide to become a beacon 
of hope in relation to the involvement of corporations on human rights 
abuses, saw the plaintiffs file a civil case before U.S. federal courts under 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for the alleged aiding & abetting by Shell of 
the Nigerian military in the commission of crimes against humanity, tor-
ture and arbitrary arrest and detention. This statute, passed in 1789 as part 
of the First Judiciary Act, sets forth that U.S. district courts have “original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”2
The issue of corporate responsibility for human rights violations, includ-
ing their participation through aiding and abetting, saw lower courts divided 
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1  Opinion, Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., Case 10-1491 (Supreme 
Court, 17 April 2013).
2  28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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on the existing framework under international law in this regard. While the 
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit dismissed the case under the premise 
that customary international law does not recognize corporate liability, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorariWRKHDUWKHFDVH$¿UVWKHDULQJZDVKHOG
on 28 February 2012, to analyze the question if corporations were immune 
from tort liability for violations of the law of nations. However, in a rare 
decision, the Supreme Court ordered the parties on 5 March 2012 to provide 
VXSSOHPHQWDOEULH¿QJRQZKHWKHUDQGXQGHUZKDWFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKH$OLHQ
Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of 
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than 
the United States. Thus, a second hearing was held on 1 October 2012.
This note will analyze the opinion delivered by the Supreme Court in 
April 2013, and make some comments on the reasoning used by the Justices 
while treating the questions of extraterritoriality and corporate responsibil-
ity under international law. As well, some ideas will be discussed on the 
immediate effects the Kiobel precedent has already had in ongoing cases 
before U.S. courts, and some insight will be provided on what this deci-
sion may mean for the business & human rights movement. This note is 
a continuation to the comment3 that appeared in the last issue of this law 
review, and thus they are to be read together for a full understanding and 
context of the Kiobel case.
II. THE KIOBEL OPINION: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The opinion of the Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, 
dealt primarily with the question of the extraterritorial reach of the Alien 
Tort Statute, which was the underlying argument that was used by the Court 
to decide the case. In this sense, the Supreme Court unanimously deter-
mined that “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims 
under the ATS, and… nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”4 To 
3  Cantú Rivera, Humberto Fernando, “Recent Developments in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum: An Important Human Rights Forum in Peril?”, Cuestiones Constitu-
cionales. Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional, No. 28, January-June, 2013, at 
243-254.
4  Opinion, Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., Case 10-1491, at 13 (Su-
preme Court, 17 April 2013).
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arrive to this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied primarily on their recent 
Morrison5 precedent, which stated that a clear indication of extraterrito-
rial reach must be present in the jurisdiction-granting statute in order for 
its domestic law to be applicable to actions occurred outside the territorial 
boundaries of the United States. This presumption against extraterritorial 
application of the law, a canon of statutory interpretation, thus limits the 
reach of American law and the jurisdiction of its courts,6 allowing them 
to govern domestic actions primarily, and only when the facts of the case 
touch and concern the territory and interests of the United States with suf-
¿FLHQWIRUFHWKHSUHVXPSWLRQPD\EHGLVSODFHGLQIDYRXURIMXULVGLFWLRQ7
The Kiobel precedent considered several questions to arrive to its conclu-
sion. Section II of the opinion, for example, dealt with issues of domestic 
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute, where the Supreme Court set forth 
that Congress must make an explicit declaration —within its text— that 
any given law is meant to have extraterritorial effects for it to overcome 
the presumption against extraterritoriality. As well, the high court made a 
clear statement that lower courts must be cautious not to generate domestic 
clashes with the Executive and Legislative branches, in charge of foreign 
policy, nor create international tension with other sovereign States, while 
adjudicating cases with clear or probable foreign policy implications.
Section III of the opinion saw the Supreme Court analyze the text, history 
and purpose of the ATS, trying to observe from its context the possibility of 
its conception as a legal instrument aimed at having extraterritorial effects. 
+RZHYHUWKHDQDO\VLVPDGHE\WKH-XVWLFHVGLGQRW¿QGDQ\FRQFOXGLQJ
evidence in favour of granting an extraterritorial application to the statute. 
In this guise, the Court again touched upon the lack of a clear indication 
of extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, without which the 
presumption against extraterritoriality would be applicable. In relation to its 
history, the Court recognized that at the time when the statute was enacted, 
three main offenses to the law of nations were recognized, namely the vio-
lation of safe conducts, the infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
SLUDF\:KLOHWKH&RXUWDUJXHGWKDWWKH¿UVWWZRGRQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\KDSSHQ
5  Opinion, Morrison et al. v. National Australia Bank Ltd. et al., Case 08-1191 (Su-
preme Court, 24 June 2010).
6  Opinion, Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., Case 10-1491, at 6 (Su-
preme Court, 17 April 2013) [“The principles underlying the presumption against extra-
territoriality thus constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS”].
7  Id. at 14.
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abroad, it recognized that piracy normally takes place outside the territo-
rial boundaries of any state; nevertheless, it considered that a claim against 
pirates does not entail transcendent direct foreign policy consequences, and 
thus was not on equal ground as other causes of action.
Finally, while considering the possible purpose of the ATS in 1789, 
Chief Justice Roberts stated that there was no indication that the statute was 
passed to make the US a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement 
of international norms. Thus, the Court concluded in section IV that “[o]n 
these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. 
And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United 
6WDWHVWKH\PXVWGRVRZLWKVXI¿FLHQWIRUFHWRGLVSODFHWKHSUHVXPSWLRQ
against extraterritorial application.”8 The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
—which had dismissed the case based on the inexistence of corporate li-
DELOLW\XQGHUFXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ²ZDVWKHUHIRUHDI¿UPHGDQG
the claim against Shell was barred.
The Supreme Court of the United States, while being cautious in its 
approach to this case, left aside some interesting arguments and questions 
involving extraterritoriality and corporate liability for participation in human 
rights violations. For example, the Court determined that the extraterritorial-
ity issue was the deciding factor in Kiobel, crafting an argument in relation 
to the inapplicability of the Alien Tort Statute to torts committed outside of 
the United States, based on the premise that it would be applying its laws 
beyond its borders and risking foreign policy implications. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court itself had already recognized in its Sosa precedent that the 
Alien Tort Statute was of a strictly jurisdictional nature,9 thus not extend-
ing the laws of the United States —at least those of a substantive nature— 
EH\RQGLWVWHUULWRULDOFRQ¿QHV,QWKLVVHQVHWZRLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWVVKRXOG
KDYHEHHQFRQVLGHUHG¿UVWRIDOOWKHSUHGHFHVVRURIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUW
of Justice, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), determined 
in its emblematic 1927 Lotus judgment the existence of a presumption of 
permissibility10 that would allow States to enact laws with extraterritorial 
8  Id.
9  Opinion, Jose Francisco Sosa v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain et al., Case No. 03-
339, at 18 (Supreme Court, 29 June 2004).
10  The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), Judgment, Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice, 7 September 1927, at 19 [“Far from laying down a general prohibition 
to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of 
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, [international law] leaves 
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UHDFKHYHQWKRVHRIDVXEVWDQWLYHQDWXUHXQOHVVDVSHFL¿FSURKLELWLRQEDUV
such application.11 This permissibility rule set forth by the PCIJ left for States 
to determine the way in which they enforce international law, establishing 
through its dictum an important characteristic: international law provides 
the substantive, conduct-regulating rule (normally a prohibition), while 
domestic law determines the procedures and remedies that would see that 
international rule applied.12 However, through its bar of the Kiobel case on 
the premise of the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court 
would not have only gone against this important international precedent, 
but also against its own case law, particularly the Charming Betsy canon,13 
which stipulates that U.S. courts shall construe its laws in conformity with 
international law.
In the second place, allowing American courts to hear foreign-cubed 
cases under the ATS would only imply that they are acting as a decentral-
ized enforcer of international law through universal jurisdiction, given that 
the conduct that is being regulated would derive directly from international 
law and not arise from domestic law.14 Also, since the action that is being 
adjudicated derives directly from the law of nations, it would be substan-
tively in force everywhere around the globe, even more so if the case in-
volves customary international law —applicable to every State— and not 
treaty law, which may be limited by the express consent of every single 
country. In this sense, even though the Supreme Court correctly interpreted 
that the conduct-regulating rule derives from international law and the ATS 
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules…]. See also Stigall, Dan E., “International Law and Limitations on the 
Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law”, Hastings International 
& Comparative Law Review, vol. 35:2, 2012, at 323-382, especially 331 on the effects of 
the Lotus judgment; and Bernaz, Nadia, “Enhancing Corporate Accountability for Human 
Rights Violations: Is Extraterritoriality the Magic Potion?”, Journal of Business Ethics, 
vol. 4, November 2012, at 18.
11  Sloss, David, “Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule without a Rationale”, Mary-
land Journal of International Law, vol. 28, Issue 1, at 242.
12  Colangelo, Anthony J., “Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction between Prescriptive 
and Adjudicative Jurisdiction”, Maryland Journal of International Law, vol. 28, Issue 
1, 2013, at 70 […international law itself doesn’t care about how it is conceptualized or 
implemented within any given domestic legal system… that’s a matter for a nation’s in-
ternal law, not international law].”
13  Opinion, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Supreme Court, 1804).
14  Colangelo, Anthony J., “The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel 
and Beyond”, Georgetown Journal of International Law, vol. 44, 2013, at 1334.
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would be its mean of domestic enforcement, the substantive character of the 
norms that would be adjudicated in Kiobel should impede the application 
of a presumption against extraterritoriality. Thus, if the norm was already 
applicable both in Nigeria and the United States because of its character as 
a customary rule of international law, and given that the ATS is recognized 
as a jurisdictional statute, federal American courts would not be extending 
the reach of their laws in any way, but merely enforcing international law 
in a manner compliant with the Lotus dictum (international law) and its 
own Charming Betsy canon (domestic law).15
In relation to the question of corporate liability under customary inter-
national law and its dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the Second Cir-
cuit that knew of the Kiobel case prior to the granting of certiorari by the 
Supreme Court, other questions appear. The Court of Appeals determined 
to dismiss Kiobel on the grounds that international law does not generally 
recognize corporate liability for violations of the law of nations;16 to arrive 
to this conclusion, the Court made an examination of the position of inter-
national treaties, courts —basically of international criminal tribunals— 
and the work of publicists. In this sense, it argued that the ICTY and the 
ICTR, for example, did not have jurisdiction over legal persons, which it 
interpreted as a sign of an inexistent corporate liability under international 
law, a position that was repeated when reviewing the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which also doesn’t provide for jurisdiction 
over legal persons.
In relation to treaties, the Court of Appeals argued that no treaty related 
to the protection of human rights expressly impose obligations on corpo-
rations, which is also a sign of the inexistence of corporate liability under 
international law. And in relation to the work of publicists, it noted that 
there is an important disagreement in scholarly writing as to the extent of 
15  Id. at 1331-1332, 1340 [“The Supreme Court has explained that courts can consid-
er “context” in determining the geographic scope of statutes. Here the context is that the 
statute authorises application of international, not domestic, law, and the relevant canon 
of construction is Charming Betsy, under which courts construe ambiguous statutes in 
conformity with international law].
16  Opinion, Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., Case No. 06-4800-cv, 06-
4876-cv (Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, 17 September 2010). See however 
Circuit Judge Pierre Leval’s separate opinion, in which he sets forth why he believes the 
Court of Appeals erred in its reasoning, despite his joining of the judgment. Also, cfr. 
Leval, Pierre N., “The Long Arm of International Law: Giving Victims of Human Rights 
Abuses Their Day in Court”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 92, no. 2, March-April 2013, at 16-21.
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the development of a customary rule that establishes corporate liability for 
human rights violations. While it holds true that looking at the statutes and 
case law of international tribunals or at the work of publicists would only 
be a sterile effort, for corporate liability has not been determined through 
such avenues in the case of tribunals, nor there is common consensus among 
scholars, a more interesting approach would be to look at international trea-
WLHV6RPHRIWKHPSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKH¿HOGRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHVKDYH
GHWHUPLQHGQRWWRGH¿QHZKRWKHSHUSHWUDWRURIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHPD\
be, but rather what the prohibited conduct is: in this sense, treaties such as 
the Genocide Convention don’t categorize the possible offenders, but rather 
H[FOXGHWKHLULGHQWL¿FDWLRQLQIDYRURIDZLGHUDSSURDFK17 As Dodge explains, 
“Corporations generally have no immunity under international law, much 
OHVVEHQH¿WIURPDWUDQVVXEVWDQWLYHUXOHRIQRQOLDELOLW\WKDWHYHQVWDWHVGR
not enjoy.”18 While it would be inconvenient to generalize the fact that some 
treaties make this apparently deliberate choice not to set out an exhaustive 
list of the subjects that may be held liable for certain international crimes, 
it could certainly add to the notion that corporations may be found liable 
under international law for gross human rights violations.
Another important point in this regard that was not considered by any of 
the courts involved in the Kiobel litigation is the work of the former Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie. 
While he expressly stated in his Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights19 that corporations only have a responsibility to respect human rights, 
he also made clear that they may be held liable under international criminal 
law for their participation in gross human rights violations amounting to 
international crimes.20 It is not to be taken lightly the fact that his work was 
17  Dodge, William S., “Corporate Liability Under Customary International Law”, 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, vol. 43, 2012, at 1048 [“Article IV (of the 
Genocide Convention) provides who shall be punished, not who shall not be punished, 
DQGLWVSXUSRVHZDVWRFRQ¿UPWKDWWKHSURKLELWLRQDJDLQVWJHQRFLGHDSSOLHVWRERWKJRY-
HUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVDQGSULYDWHSHUVRQV´@
18  Id. at 1047.
19  UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Im-
plementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 21 March 
2011.
20  UN Doc. A/HRC/4/35, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Stan-
dards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, 19 February 2007, at 
9, 15 [“Indeed, corporate responsibility is being shaped through the interplay of two 
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endorsed unanimously by the Human Rights Council, a validation that can 
only show the extent to which States agree on his position regarding corpo-
rate responsibility. While outside of the scope of this note,21 the approval by 
the Human Rights Council and the community of States represented therein 
of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, as well as 
the subsequent dissemination and application at international, regional and 
national levels by multiple actors, States and organizations could in time 
help to shape the formation of a customary norm of international law in this 
regard, and are proof of a movement that may have profound implications 
for the business & human rights agenda in the near future.
An interesting approach which may well show the future road for claims 
brought under the Alien Tort Statute was the proposal made by Justice Ste-
phen Breyer in his concurring opinion. While Justice Breyer and the female 
members of the Court agreed on the judgment of the Supreme Court22 in 
Kiobel but not in its opinion, he laid out a test describing the factors he would 
consider to determine if American courts have jurisdiction for violations of 
the law of nations that took place outside of the territorial boundaries of the 
United States. In this sense, a more neutral approach to the question of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction was used; Breyer thus proposed that American 
courts would have jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute if the tort occurs 
on American soil, if the defendants are of American nationality, or if the 
defendant’s conduct affects an American national interest. Nevertheless, 
GHYHORSPHQWVRQH LV WKHH[SDQVLRQDQG UH¿QHPHQWRI LQGLYLGXDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\E\ WKH
international ad hoc criminal tribunals and the ICC Statute; the other is the extension 
of responsibility for international crimes to corporations under domestic law. The com-
plex interaction between the two is creating an expanding web of potential corporate 
liability for international crimes, imposed through national courts.” However, he also 
states a different view in the human rights realm: “In conclusion, it does not seem that 
the international human rights instruments discussed here currently impose direct legal 
responsibilities on corporations”]. See also Ruggie, John G., “Kiobel and Corporate So-
cial Responsibility”, 4 September 2012, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/
CSRI/KIOBEL_AND_CORPORATE_SOCIAL_RESPONSIBILITY%20(3).pdf.
21  For a more profound insight on the “hardening” of soft law, see Cantú Rivera, 
Humberto Fernando, “Recent Developments in Extraterritoriality and Soft Law: Towards 
New Measures to Hold Corporations Accountable for their Human Rights Performance?”, 
Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, vol. XIV, 2014 (Forthcoming).
22  Breyer considered in his concurring opinion that in Kiobel, the parties and the rel-
HYDQWFRQGXFWODFNHGVXI¿FLHQWWLHVWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RQFXUULQJ2SLQLRQRI-XVWLFH
Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor, Kiobel et al. v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum et al., Case 10-1491, at 14-15 (Supreme Court, 17 April 2013).
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given that the facts in Kiobel didn’t have a strong connection to the United 
States and the accusation was not of a crime perpetrated by the defendants 
but rather a matter of aiding and abetting, the Justices joined the judgment 
of the Supreme Court. Some life still remains in the Alien Tort Statute,23 
although the Kiobel precedent drastically limited its possibilities to continue 
being a legal remedy available to victims of human rights abuses world-
wide.24 In this sense, only future lawsuits will clear the scenario under which 
corporations —which are not yet granted immunity under the Alien Tort 
6WDWXWHE\DGH¿QLWHUHDGLQJRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUW²PD\EH
brought to justice for contributing to negative human rights impacts, if at all.
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE KIOBEL PRECEDENT 
WITHIN U.S. JURISDICTION
The Kiobel opinion immediately became an important precedent and 
potentially a setback for the human rights movement. While the effects 
this Supreme Court decision will have at the international level cannot be 
fully grasped until more jurisprudential developments start to appear, it 
certainly marked a victory for foreign corporations doing business in the 
United States, generally putting them outside the reach of American courts 
and of the Alien Tort Statute.
23  Concurring Opinion of Justice Anthony Kennedy, Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Pe-
troleum et al., Case 10-1491, at 1 (Supreme Court, 17 April 2013), where he states that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality may yet be elaborated in future cases, and that 
there are some open questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort 
Statute.
24  6RPHSURSRVHWKDWWKHQHDUGHDWKRIWKH$76FDQDFWXDOO\EHDEHQH¿FLDOVLWXDWLRQ
for the human rights movement worldwide, since that would force activists to focus on 
the root of the problem —a matter of domestic policy and implementation of interna-
tional standards— instead than on granting small-scale palliatives to those with enough 
resources to access US courts. Vid. Moyn, Samuel, “Why the Court Was Right About 
the Alien Tort Statute: A Better Way to Promote Human Rights”, Foreign Affairs, 2 May 
2013, accessed on 18 November 2013 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139359/
samuel-moyn/why-the-court-was-right-about-the-alien-tort-statute [“Far better would be 
to move on to other ways of protecting human rights —less centered on courts, less 
UXVKHGIRUDTXLFN¿[OHVVFRQFHUQHGZLWKVSHFWDFXODUZURQJVWRLQGLYLGXDOVDQGPRUH
with structural evils, and less disconnected from social movements abroad. And there are 
also better ways to protect humanity in the age of powerful multinational corporations, 
notably regulatory schemes that connect far more clearly to the originally welfarist mean-
ing of human rights].”
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Within the American judicial system, it had direct effects in two cases 
VRIDU7KH¿UVWRQHSarei et al. v. Rio Tinto, PLC et al. before the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was a case brought under the Alien Tort 
Statute on allegations that the operations of the Rio Tinto mining group on 
the island of Bougainville, in Papua New Guinea, had resulted in many 
deaths following demonstrations and uprisings in the late 1980s that were 
appeased with the use of military force. The context, which allegedly in-
volved the aiding and abetting of Rio Tinto in the military operation against 
the demonstrators, was similar to the facts in Kiobel. Nevertheless, Rio 
Tinto did have important operations in North America, which could bring it 
before American jurisdiction since personal jurisdiction was not disputed.25
The District Court that knew of the case held that the claim for racial 
discrimination, crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes was dis-
PLVVHGEDVHGRQWKUHHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV¿UVWWKDWWKHFRXUWODFNHGMXULVGLF-
tion because claims arose outside of the territorial boundaries of the United 
States. Second, that the claims were inadmissible because they were brought 
against corporations; and third, that aiding and abetting liability is outside 
the scope of international law. The Court of Appeals, however, decided to 
analyze those jurisdictional issues raised by the District Court.
Regarding the issue of extraterritoriality, the Court of Appeals held that 
when enacting the Alien Tort Statute, Congress intended to provide juris-
diction for certain violations of international law that took place outside 
of the United States, and that there were no indications to the contrary; as 
well, it mentioned that there was no extraterritorial bar applicable to the 
facts in Rio Tinto.26 On corporate liability, the Court stated that the ATS, 
its language and its legislative history did not exclude corporate liability 
from its scope, which would them provide them with jurisdiction over the 
defendants.27 Finally, the Court determined that the ATS does not bar aid-
ing and abetting liability, thus ordering that the dismissal of the claims for 
genocide and war crimes was reversed, and that the case was to be remanded 
to the district court for proceedings on such claims.28
What was an apparent provisional victory for the plaintiffs turned out to 
be just a temporary relief, when in 22 April 2013, the Supreme Court or-
25  Opinion, Sarei et al. v. Rio Tinto, PLC et al., Case No. 02-56256, at 19334 (Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 25 October 2011).
26  Id. at 19339.
27  Id. at 19341.
28  Id. at 19380.
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dered the decision of the Court of Appeals to be vacated and remanded for 
further consideration in light of the Kiobel precedent. After another round 
RIFRQVLGHUDWLRQWKHPDMRULW\RIWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOVGHWHUPLQHGWRDI¿UP
the judgment of dismissal by the District Court.297KXVWKH¿UVWYLFWLPRIWKH
presumption against extraterritoriality were the plaintiffs in the case, which 
then saw upheld an indirect presumption against corporate liability under 
the Alien Tort Statute.
A second case which is now being considered before the United States 
Supreme Court is Bauman et al. v. DaimlerChrysler AG et al. Considered 
to be the continuation to Kiobel because of the facts of the case and its his-
tory in the lower courts, it was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court 
after a judgment of the Court of Appeals saw DaimlerChrysler AG (DCAG) 
subjected to personal jurisdiction in California under the Alien Tort Statute 
and the Torture Victims Protection Act through its American subsidiary, 
Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), a decision that was deemed “reasonable, 
fair and just” given the importance of the Californian market to the Ger-
man vehicle company.30
The plaintiffs in the case, 22 Argentinean residents, alleged that one of 
DaimlerChrysler AG’s subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated 
with State authorities and security forces to kidnap, detain, torture and kill 
plaintiffs during the military dictatorship in Argentina. Initially, the District 
Court that heard the case dismissed the claim for lack or jurisdiction, since 
there was no agency between the German DCAG and its American sub-
sidiary MBUSA, and because exercise of jurisdiction in California would 
be unfair and unreasonable to the foreign parent corporation based on the 
activities of its U.S. subsidiary.
On 28 August 2009, the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court judg-
ment, stating that it did not have personal jurisdiction over DCAG;31 however, 
it granted a rehearing to the plaintiffs on 06 May 2010, withdrawing its 2009 
opinion.32 In a rare turnaround, the Court of Appeals then determined on May 
18, 2011 that DCAG was subject to personal jurisdiction,33 reversing the 
29  Order, Sarei et al. v. Rio Tinto, PLC et al., Case No. 02-56256, at 4 (Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, 28 June 2013).
30  Opinion, Bauman et al. v. DaimlerChrsyler Corporation et al., Case No. 07-15386 
(Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 18 May 2011).
31  Id., 28 August 2009.
32  Id., 6 May 2010.
33  Id. at 6560 (18 May 2011) [“DCAG was subject to personal jurisdiction in Califor-
www.juridicas.unam.mx
Esta revista forma parte del acervo de la Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx
HUMBERTO CANTÚ RIVERA220
judgment of the District Court and remanding the case for further proceed-
ings. A rehearing was denied on 9 November 2011,34 which thus paved the 
way for DaimlerChrysler AG to request certiorari to the Supreme Court.35
%HIRUHEULHÀ\UHYLHZLQJWKHTXHVWLRQVEHIRUHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQDaim-
ler, it is important to note that the analysis made by the Court of Appeals 
had some interesting arguments that may contribute to the determination 
of a corporate human rights responsibility within the domestic context. To 
H[HUFLVHJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUDGHIHQGDQWDFRXUWPXVW¿QGWKDWDFDXVH
of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s activities 
in the forum State.36 In Bauman, the Court of Appeals examined whether 
its granting of general jurisdiction over DCAG in California respected the 
constitutional Due Process clause; to determine it, the Court relied on two 
tests: agency and control.
In relation to the agency test, the examination was in relation to the im-
portance of services provided by the subsidiary. The panel determined that a 
subsidiary acts as an agent if the parent company would perform the service 
itself if it had no representative to act for them.37 As well, the control test 
aimed at considering if the parent company controls substantial aspects of 
its subsidiary’s operations.38 After analyzing its conclusions from both tests, 
the Court determined that DCAG effectively controlled MBUSA, which 
acted as its agent, focusing then on pondering if the courts in California 
would constitute a fair and reasonable forum to DaimlerChrysler AG. Since 
Germany —according to the Court— apparently wouldn’t recognize a hu-
man rights action against corporate defendants, and Argentinean law had 
established a statute of limitations of two years and three months, where no 
redress against corporations for their actions during the military dictatorship 
could be granted, the Court of Appeals determined that Daimler AG could 
therefore be sued in California for alleged human rights violations commit-
ted in Argentina by an Argentinean subsidiary against Argentine residents.
nia through the contacts of its subsidiary MBUSA. We hold that MBUSA was DCAG’s 
agent, at least for personal jurisdiction purposes, and that exercise of personal jurisdiction 
was reasonable under the circumstances of this case”].
34  Id., 9 November 2011.
35  Daimler AG v. Bauman et al., Case No. 11-965 (Supreme Court).
36  Opinion, Bauman et al. v. DaimlerChrsyler Corporation et al., Case No. 07-15386, 
at 6574 (Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 18 May 2011).
37  Id. at 6578.
38  Id. at 6583.
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The question before the Supreme Court, which granted a hearing on 
this case barely a few days after issuing its Kiobel opinion at the request 
of Daimler AG, is whether it violates due process for a court to exercise 
general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the 
fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the 
defendant in the forum State.
During oral argument on 15 October 2013, some interesting issues were 
raised. Justice Kennedy asked to Daimler’s attorney if the creation of a 
subsidiary would not mean that the parent corporation avails itself of juris-
diction, particularly more so if the parent company was of dual nationality 
(German and American at the time when the conduct happened).39 Justice 
Ginsburg, on the other hand, asserted that the legal thought on issues of 
jurisdiction has changed enormously since 1898, when the Court resolved a 
case (Barrow Steamship Company v. Kane) of general jurisdiction that also 
involved foreign corporations and their subsidiaries in the United States.40 
Hints of how the Supreme Court may rule in Daimler AG were provided 
by both Justices Breyer and Ginsburg: Breyer, for instance, suggested the 
case may be sent back for consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 
Goodyear41 and Kiobel42 precedents —dealing with the issues of general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality, respectively—, thus setting a double standard to be overcome if 
courts are to have jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants. Justice 
Ginsburg also pointed to the fact that Goodyear established a benchmark as 
to where corporations may be sued: either at its place of incorporation, or at 
its principal place of business.43 While the Supreme Court will not decide 
this case until mid-2014, it is possible that it may look to reduce even further 
39  Transcript of the hearing, Daimler AG v. Bauman et al., Case No. 11-965, at 13 
(Supreme Court, 15 October 2013).
40  Id.DW7KLVDI¿UPDWLRQKRZHYHUVHHPVVRPHKRZLQFRKHUHQWLQOLJKWRIWKHKio-
bel precedent; could the Court not have asked the same question in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum? While it is true that in Kiobel there was no American subsidiary involved 
(which would touch and concern the territory of the United States with more force than 
MXVWDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI¿FHWKHDSSDUHQWGHSDUWXUHLQWKHUHDVRQLQJLVQRWRULRXV
41  Opinion, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. et al. v. Brown et ux., Co-Admin-
istrators of the Estate of Brown, et al., Case 10-76 (Supreme Court, 27 June 2011).
42  Opinion, Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., Case 10-1491 (Supreme 
Court, 17 April 2013).
43  Opinion, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. et al. v. Brown et ux., Co-Admin-
istrators of the Estate of Brown, et al., Case 10-76, at 7 (Supreme Court, 27 June 2011).
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the scope of the Alien Tort Statute, as well as the exercise of jurisdiction 
over foreign corporate defendants,44ZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPHWU\LQJWRGH¿QH
a clearer picture of when a civil action by an alien for a tort, committed in 
violation of the law of nations, may be actionable before American courts.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
As the United States Supreme Court clearly expressed in its Kiobel 
precedent, the American Congress would need to legislate in order for its 
courts to have jurisdiction over extraterritorial human rights abuses. The 
VDPHZRXOGEH UHTXLUHG IRU WKHP WR¿QG MXULVGLFWLRQRYHUFRUSRUDWLRQV
given the inexact wording and little history known in relation to the Alien 
7RUW6WDWXWHDQGWKHSHUSHWXDOLQGH¿QLWHQHVVRIFXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ
The Kiobel ruling limited to a great extent the use of the Alien Tort Statute. 
$QRSSRUWXQLW\IRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWWRGH¿QHZKDWW\SH
of actions “touch and concern the territory of the United States” is before 
them; however, it may yet again incline to maintain a conservative stance on 
the issue of corporate responsibility for human rights abuses, shying away 
from an international trend that is polarized on this issue, but that appears 
to be in desperate need for guidance and leadership.
44  Despite the fact that the German Institute for Human Rights, Germany’s national 
human rights institution (NHRI) in accordance with the UN Paris principles, contended 
that Germany is not a reasonable alternative forum (which would comply with the Good-
year precedent on where a corporation may be sued). This position is due to the fact that 
courts in Germany would apply lex loci damni, substantive law that was applicable at 
the place where the wrong was committed. In this sense, German courts would apply 
Argentinean substantive law as it was in force when the abuses were committed; such 
law (Argentine Civil Code) refuses to recognize these types of claims, while also having 
a strict statute of limitations that would effectively bar claims against the German parent 
company arising out of human rights abuses. In addition, procedural obstacles would 
also be present, such as language and litigation costs, which are extremely high for non-
European plaintiffs. Another important point argued by the German NHRI is the fact that 
ZKHQFODLPVZHUH¿OHG'DLPOHUZDVMRLQWO\KHDGTXDUWHUHGDQGFRQWLQXRXVO\DQGV\VWHP-
atically doing business in the United States: “In substance, this is a case of United States 
courts exercising jurisdiction over a United States company for the conduct of one of its 
subsidiaries abroad.” It must be noted also that Germany did not object to the exercise 
of jurisdiction over Daimler Ag. Cfr. Brief of Amici Curiae German Institute for Human 
Rights and Other German Legal Experts in Support of Respondents, Daimler AG v. Bau-
man et al., Case No. 11-965, at 3-13 (Supreme Court, 26 August 2013).
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